外汇交易员们近来热议一项新的广场协议

Foreign exchange traders are buzzing with talk of a new “Plaza Accord”, following the marked change in the behaviour of the major currencies after the Shanghai G20 meetings in late February.

外汇交易员们近来热议一项新的“广场协议”(Plaza Accord)，因为在20国集团(G20) 2月下旬在上海开会之后，主要货币走势出现了显著变化。

Since then, the dollar has weakened, just as it did after the Plaza meetings on 22 September 1985. The Chinese renminbi has been falling against its basket, in direct contrast with the “stable basket” exchange rate policy that was publicly emphasisedby PBOC Governor Zhou just before Shanghai. The euro and, especially, the yen have strengthened, in defiance of monetary policy easing by the ECB and the Bank of Japan.

自G20会议以来，美元有所贬值，就像1985年9月22日的广场会议之后那样。人民币相对其货币篮子不断贬值，与中国央行(PBoC)行长周小川在上海会议前夕强调的“稳定篮子”汇率政策相悖。欧元、尤其是日元有所升值，不理会欧洲央行(ECB)和日本央行(BoJ)的宽松货币政策。

Following Shanghai, the markets have become loathe to push the dollar higher, believing that the G20 may now have come to a co-ordinated agreement, as they did at the Plaza, to reverse the direction of the US currency. Does this comparison make any economic sense?

上海会议以来，市场变得不愿推高美元，认为G20如今或许已达成了一份协调的协议（就像当年几个大国在纽约广场饭店(Plaza Hotel)所做的那样），以扭转美元汇率走势。这种对比在经济上有道理吗？

The Shanghai communique did place increased emphasis on an agreement among the major economies to avoid “competitive devaluations”. The main suspects here were Japan, the Eurozone and (sometimes) China, all of whom have good reasons to push their currencies down. The fact that the communique eschewed this course of action is therefore a reason to believe that the dollar might be subjected to less upward pressure. But that does not make it a new Plaza.

上海会议的公告的确强调，主要经济体达成了避免“竞争性贬值”的共识。在这方面，主要嫌疑人是日本和欧元区，有时还包括中国，这三个经济体都有充足理由压低本币。公告反对这一做法的事实，成了相信美元上涨压力或许会减弱的一条理由。但这并不使其成为新的广场协议。

The 1985 Plaza Accord was probably the most dramatic coordinated intervention in the foreign exchange markets since floating currencies began in 1971. The dollar had been rising markedly for several years, largely as a result of Ronald Reagan’s fiscal expansion, combined with Paul Volcker’s monetary squeeze. By 1985, the rise in the dollar was widely agreed to have exceeded economic fundamentals, and most G7 governments thought there were speculative elements involved.

1985年广场协议很可能是自1971年浮动汇率制启动以来，国际社会对外汇市场进行的最剧烈的一致干预。在那之前的几年里，美元大幅上涨，这主要是罗纳德•里根(Ronald Reagan)的财政扩张，以及保罗•沃尔克(Paul Volcker)的货币收紧的结果。到1985年，市场普遍认为，美元汇率水平已超前于经济基本面；同时7国集团(G7)的多数政府认为，这其中含有投机成分。

The strong dollar was at first warmly welcomed by the US Treasury, led by Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and Beryl Sprinkel, the Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs and the icon of free market currency policies at the time. But when the leadership of the Treasury passed to the much more pragmatic James Baker in February 1985, the US attitude began to change. The US manufacturing sector was being squeezed by the overvalued dollar, and Congress was seriously contemplating protectionist policies against Japan and Germany. Something had to be done.

刚开始，强势美元得到了美国财政部的热烈欢迎，尤其是时任财长唐纳德•里甘(Donald Regan)和负责货币事务的副国务卿、当时自由市场汇率政策的标杆人物贝里尔•斯普林克尔(Beryl Sprinkel)的。但在1985年2月财政部领导人换成了更加务实的詹姆斯•贝克(James Baker)之后，美国官方立场开始改变。当时美元高估冲击了美国制造业，国会正在认真考虑出台针对日本和德国的保护主义政策。里根政府必须有所作为。

The dollar actually started to fall in April 1985, many months in advance of the Plaza meeting itself. Earlier G7 meetings had discussed foreign exchange interventions, and the Bundesbank was believed to have sold dollars repeatedly in the spring. But it was only when the Plaza statement appeared in September that the slide in the dollar turned into a rout.

1985年4月，美元实际上已开始贬值了，比广场会议早了好几个月。更早的G7会议讨论过干预汇市，德国央行(Bundesbank)据信在那年春季多次抛售美元。但只是在9月广场协议声明发表后，美元走势才从小跌变成大跌。

From start to finish, the international policy shift surrounding the Plaza meeting caused a 40 per cent decline in the dollar over a period of 3 years. It was the high water mark for co-ordinated global macro-economic policy, and for direct central bank intervention in the currency markets. (See this superb analysis of Plaza by Jeffrey Frankel at the Harvard Kennedy School.)

由始至终，围绕广场会议的国际政策变化，导致美元在3年内贬值了40%，整件事堪称全球宏观经济政策协调和央行直接干预汇市的标杆。（参阅哈佛大学肯尼迪学院(Harvard Kennedy School)的杰弗里•弗兰克尔(Jeffrey Frankel)对广场协议的出色分析文章。）

Could it happen again? At present, the formal agreements among G20 economies are predicated on two principles – no concerted intervention in the currency markets, and no deliberate attempts to engage in competitive devaluations. This does not seem to leave any room for a co-ordinated set of foreign exchange interventions to devalue the dollar.

广场协议的历史可能重演吗？当前，G20经济体达成的正式共识是基于两条原则的——不对汇市进行协同干预，以及不刻意进行竞争性贬值。这似乎没有为协调干预外汇市场、压低美元留下任何空间。

Furthermore, there is no agreement among the major nations that the dollar needs to be devalued. It is not widely seen to be overvalued on fundamental grounds. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to 1985, when Germany and Japan were willing to accept rising exchange rates to head off US trade protection and dampen domestic inflation, there is no willingness anywhere in the G20 to accept a currency revaluation. Deflation pressures are too threatening for that, as Japan is now demonstrating.

此外，大国间并未达成美元需要贬值的共识。从基本面来看，美元被高估并非各方广泛认同的观点。再者，跟1985年形成鲜明对照的是，那时的德国和日本乐于接受汇率升值、以化解美国贸易保护威胁并抑制国内通胀，但如今的G20经济体中，谁也不愿接受汇率重估。那么做的通缩压力太可怕了，正如当前的日本所展示的那样。

There is a good case for arguing that, if there were to be a new Plaza Accord, it should be applied to the Chinese renminbi, not to the US dollar. China has been the main loser from the currency wars of the present decade. Its real exchange rate has risen by 40 per cent since 2010, while the dollar has risen somewhat and the other major economies have all depreciated sharply. Although there is no agreement that this has left the renminbi greatly overvalued (since it started in 2010 from an undervalued level) this rise has exacerbated deflationary pressures in China and left the currency in an unstable condition.

人们有充分理由主张，如果真的有一份新的广场协议，那它应当适用于人民币、而不是美元。中国已成为本十年汇率战的主要输家。自2010年以来，人民币的实际汇率累计升值40%，而美元只是有所升值，其他主要经济体的货币都大幅贬值了。尽管不是所有人都认为这已导致人民币严重高估（因为人民币是在2010年从低估水平开始升值的），但这种升值已恶化了中国国内的通缩压力，并使人民币陷于一种不稳定状态。

The global economy might benefit from a controlled downward float in the renminbi. This would puncture the exaggerated fears of uncontrolled Chinese devaluation in the global markets. But any such agreement seems completely off the international political agenda. In the US, no politician in an election year could contemplate any such thing.

全球经济或许会受益于人民币的受控贬值。这将化解全球市场对于人民币失控贬值的被夸大的担心。但是，这种协议似乎不可能进入国际政治议程。在美国，没有一个政客可以在选举年考虑这种事情。

So where does that leave the supposed Plaza Accord of 2016? There is no such thing, at least in a formal and explicit sense. And nor will there be. There is no consensus among the leading nations, either that the dollar needs to be pushed lower, or that the renminbi is overvalued. In an era of global disinflation, no country is willing to allow others to devalue.

那么，应该如何看待想象中的2016版广场协议呢？根本没有这样的协议，起码没有正式、明确的版本。未来也不会有。在美元需要被压低、或是人民币目前被高估的问题上，主要国家之间不存在共识。在全球“通胀减速”时代，没有一个国家愿意允许其他国家贬值货币。

However, it is possible that there has been a different form of accommodation, in which both China and the US Federal Reserve have independently decided that they have needed to adjust their strategy in response to the financial turbulence in January. One interpretation is that China seriously contemplated a major devaluation around the turn of the year, after experiencing difficulties in coping with the capital outflows that followed the Fed’s rate hike on 15 December.

然而，可能出现某种不同的宽松——中国和美联储(Fed)分别决定，他们需要调整自己的策略，以回应今年1月的金融动荡。一种解读是，在应对去年12月15日美联储加息引发的资本外流时遇到种种困难后，中国在今年初前后曾认真考虑大幅贬值人民币。

Having seen the international consequences of its initial rate rise, and the unintended tightening in US financial conditions that ensued, the Fed then decided that it could not persist with its intended pace of interest rate increases unless China stabilised its economy first. This was not so much an accord as an independent meeting of minds.

在看到首次加息后的国际后果和随之而来的美国金融状况意外收紧之后，美联储判断，在中国经济企稳之前，它不能维持原定的加息步伐。这与其说是一份协议，不如说是想到一块去了。

The effects of this meeting of minds on exchange rates will last only until the Fed reverts to its earlier determination to “normalise” interest rates for domestic reasons. That is unlikely to happen at the FOMC meeting on Wednesday, but it probably cannot be postponed for much longer.

这一不谋而合对汇率的影响，将只会延续到美联储恢复早先的决心（为了国内需要而实行利率“正常化”）。在4月的美联储联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)上，不太可能出现这一局面，但这很可能不会拖得太久。