俄罗斯天然气公司:受伤的巨人

THE good times for Gazprom once seemed like they would never end. The world’s largest natural-gas producer, founded out of the old Soviet gas ministry, enjoyed sky-high gas prices for years. The gas flowed along pipelines into Europe; the profits flowed back. Gazprom began work on a $1.9 billion headquarters in St Petersburg and acted as a bottomless wallet for Russia’s rulers. Whatever problems it encountered, it could “drown with money”, as Natalia Volchkova of the New Economic School in Moscow puts it.

曾经无人会相信俄罗斯天然气公司的好时光会结束。这家全球最大的天然气制造商，在前苏联天然气部门的基础上成立，数年来坐拥天价天然气。天然气通过管道涌入欧洲；利润则从欧洲滚滚而来。俄天然气公司投资19亿美元在圣彼得堡建立公司总部，并成为俄罗斯统治者取之不尽的大钱包。正如来自莫斯科新经济学院的Natalia Volchkova所说：“无论遇到何种问题，该公司都能用钱摆平。”

All this is now under threat. Its ageing gasfields are in decline. Thanks to America’s shale boom, gas is more plentiful on the world market. Gazprom’s European customers are realising that they have other choices. The prices it can charge are falling, and with them the firm’s prospects.

而目前，所有这一切都在遭受威胁。很多气田经过多年开采已经减产。多亏了美国页岩气开采量大增，保证了全球市场的燃气充足。俄天然气公司的欧洲客户也开始意识到他们还有其他选择。俄天然气公司可收取的价格也不断下跌，随之而来的是公司利润的缩减。

Years of easy money have made Gazprom fat and slow. It dominates its domestic market, producing 75% of Russia’s gas. It enjoys a monopoly over exports of the stuff. Until recently, it had a tight grip on western Europe, where it supplies around 25% of gas. It retains an even tighter grip on former Soviet-bloc countries in eastern Europe. For a long time, this insulated Gazprom from shifts in global gas markets.

多年来，俄天然气公司轻而易举地获得巨额利润，导致公司结构臃肿，执行力缓慢。该公司主导国内市场，俄罗斯75%的天然气产自该公司。同时，该公司也在出口上实行垄断。直到最近，该公司一直都还紧紧掌握着西欧市场，西欧市场25%的天然气来自该地区。同时，该公司在前苏联国家的东欧市场地位更是根深蒂固。长期以来，俄天然气公司俨然与世隔绝，完全不受全球天然气市场任何影响。

Gazprom is not a normal company. It serves two masters. As a firm that issues shares to outside investors, it should in theory strive to maximise profits in the long run. But since it is majority-owned by the Russian state, it pursues political goals, too.

俄天然气公司并不是一家常规的公司。该公司同侍二主。作为一家对外投资者发行股票的公司，理论上说，该公司应该致力于最大化长期利润。但由于该公司大部分股权属于俄罗斯政府，它也同时致力于实现政治目标。

In practice, it serves one master more assiduously than the other. As President Vladimir Putin consolidated his power in the early 2000s, he built Gazprom into a main instrument of Russia’s new state capitalism. He appointed allies to top positions. He used Gazprom as a tool of foreign policy, for example by cutting off gas supplies to Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova during political rows.

实际上，该公司显然更殷勤地为其中一主效劳。早在本世纪初，普京总统巩固其政权时，他将俄天然气公司建立成为俄罗斯新国家资本主义的主要工具。总统任命同僚为该公司最高领导人。普京总统将俄天然气公司打造成外交工具。在政治争议期间，俄天然气公司中断了对格鲁吉亚、乌克兰、白俄罗斯和摩尔多瓦的天然气供应。

Gazprom’s deep pockets have helped Mr Putin at home, too. It sells gas cheaply in Russia, so that the poor do not freeze in winter. Oddly for an energy company, it has bought television stations and newspapers, all of which are now friendly to the Kremlin. Mikhail Krutikhin of RusEnergy, a consultancy, says, “Gazprom has one manager: Putin.”

在国内，财力雄厚的俄天然气公司也帮了普京总统大忙。该公司在国内以低价出售天然气，从而保证贫困人口在冬天取暖。对于一家能源公司来说，收购电视台和报纸的行为实属罕见，并且这些媒体现在对俄政府都十分友好。来自俄能源投资集团的顾问Mikhail Krutikhin说道：“俄天然气公司只有一个老板，那就是普京。”

With friends in high places, Gazprom has enjoyed low taxes and privileged access to gasfields. But its costs are startlingly high. It treats its executives generously: a 2008 tender, for example, included a solarium and a special bath for horses. It buys supplies in an idiosyncratic fashion, too. The Peterson Institute for International Economics, a think-tank, reckons that although Gazprom posted nominal profits of $46 billion in 2011, it lost $40 billion to corruption and inefficiency.

俄天然气仗着身居政坛高位的朋友，享受着低税政策，并且可优先开采天然气田。但该公司的成本仍然高地令人瞠目结舌。该公司对其供应商出手特别大方：以2008年一家投标方为例，采购内容为马匹所用的日光浴室和特殊的浴室。该公司采购的也是以特殊方式供应的产品。彼得森国际经济研究所的一位智囊表示，虽然2011年俄天然气公司公布的名义利润为460亿美元，但实际上，因腐败和无作为，该公司损失掉400亿美元。

And some projects favoured by Mr Putin are of questionable economic value. For example, he is dead set on building a $21-billion South Stream pipeline between southern Russia and Austria via eastern Europe. This project has political appeal because it would bypass troublesome Ukraine as the main transit route for gas to Europe. But given weak prices and demand, it is “commercial idiocy”, says Mr Krutikhin. The opening in 2011 of Nord Stream, an offshore pipeline to Germany, was a diplomatic coup for Mr Putin, but it is still running far below capacity.

一些普京总统青睐的项目，经济价值也遭到质疑。例如，他坚定不移致力于贯穿东欧，在俄罗斯南部和奥地利之间铺设造价高达210亿美元的南溪天然气管道。这一项目具有政治诱惑力，因为该项目将避开乌克兰，该国使天然气到达欧洲的主要中转站，但同时也麻烦不断的国家。但考虑到低廉的价格和疲软的需求量，Krutikhin认为这是一场“愚蠢的商业行为”。继而2011年北溪项目的开启，铺设通往德国的海底管道，也是普京总统的外交壮举，但该项目运行仍远未达到计划产量。

These days, Gazprom is finding itself in an unfamiliar situation: it has more problems and less money with which to drown them. On March 4th its shares hit a four-year low. Investors reckon Gazprom is worth only a third as much as it was in 2008. By one broker’s calculation its market capitalisation of $110 billion is barely half the value of its assets.

最近，俄天然气公司对自身处境也深感困惑：问题重重，资金越来越少。在今年3月4日，其股价跌至四年最低值。投资者认为目前俄天然气公司的价值仅为2008年的三分之一。根据一位经纪人的预计，该公司1100亿美元市值仅为其资产总价值的一半。