土耳其式"半吊子"民主没有出路

By definition, municipal elections are about choosing local leaders. Yet Turkey’s local elections this weekend will be about much more. It is set to be a contest between two visions of democracy and its outcome will have serious implications for the future of democratic freedoms in this crucial western ally.

地方选举顾名思义应该是关于地方领导人的选举。不过本周末土耳其举行的地方选举，代表的意义会丰富得多。这次选举势必成为一场两种民主愿景的竞赛，选举结果也将对这个西方关键盟友的民主自由前途产生深远影响。

For Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling AK party, an initial decade of relative calm ended with the protests focused on Gezi park on Istanbul’s Taksim Square last year, which led to a nationwide mobilisation against the prime minister’s polarising and paternalistic style. More recently the government has faced fresh pressure following a wave of corruption allegations, leaked mostly almost on a daily basis through social media.

对雷杰普•塔伊普•埃尔多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)领导的执政党“正义与发展党”(AK party)而言，去年在伊斯坦布尔塔克西姆广场(Taksim Square)加济公园(Gezi Park)爆发的抗议，为第一个相对平静的十年划上了句号。爆发于加济公园的抗议后来演变成一场全国性抗议，针对的是土耳其总理埃尔多安极化、家长式的执政风格。最近，在社交媒体上几乎每天都有指控土耳其官员腐败的新材料爆出，让土耳其政府面临新的压力。

The prime minister’s response to these challenges – besides banning Twitter and YouTube – has been to sidestep criticisms by emphasising his government’s legitimacy to rule the country. While campaigning for his local candidates, Mr Erdogan has stressed the importance of the national will, reiterating his belief that the primary source of legitimacy for governments is elections. This is also the reason he has opted to turn the local polls into a referendum on him and his AK party.

面对这些挑战，土耳其总理的应对方式一直是，强调本届土耳其政府的执政合法性，回避批评者提出的问题，此外，他还封杀了Twitter和YouTube。在为本党地方候选人助选时，埃尔多安一直强调国家意志的重要性，再三重申他认为政府合法性的主要来源是选举。他之所以选择将这次地方选举变成对他本人以及正义与发展党的公投，原因也在于此。

But the real importance of the local elections will rather be in determining the next phase of Mr Erdogan’s political stratagem, and therefore of Turkey’s near-term political path. Depending on the outcome of the local elections, the prime minister might decide to become a candidate in presidential elections scheduled for August. His party would need to get close to the 50 per cent it received in the 2011 parliamentary elections for him to consider this option seriously. Failing this, he would want to lead his party in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2015.

不过，地方选举真正重要的意义其实在于，它会决定埃尔多安如何设计下一阶段的政治策略，从而决定土耳其短期内的政治轨迹。地方选举结果会决定埃尔多安是否会决定以候选人身份参加定于8月举行的总统选举。而他领导的正义与发展党需接近50%的得票率，埃尔多安才能严肃考虑这一选项，50%是2011年的选举中该党的得票率。否则，他可能会希望领导正义与发展党参加定于2015年举行的议会选举。

Changing the AK party’s bylaws that stipulate a three-term leadership limit would enable him to continue his political career. A third scenario that cannot be ruled out is the AK party registering a substantive drop in support to, say, 35 per cent. That would force Mr Erdogan to spend his political capital in the near term to ensure the cohesion of his party in the face of an increased risk of internal dissent.

他可以通过修改正义与发展党章程中有关领导人最多只能连任3次的规定，来继续自己的政治生涯。当然也不能排除第三种情况，即正义与发展党支持率大幅下滑，比如下滑至35%。这会迫使埃尔多安短期内利用自己的政治资本确保本党团结，以应对日益凸显的党内分歧风险。

For Mr Erdogan, the second pillar of his legitimacy is the evidence of his government’s performance. That is why his campaigning for his party’s local candidates is laden with references to roads built, social programmes launched and surges in welfare that have been realised under his rule. But what he fails to take into account is “process legitimacy” – which is incidentally the source of Turkey’s recent instability.

对埃尔多安而言，合法性的第二个支柱是其政府的政绩。正因如此，他在为本党地方候选人造势时，不断强调在他执政期间，政府修建了多少公路、推出了多少社会保障项目、福利水平攀升多么快。但他未考虑“程序合法性”，而这恰好是土耳其近期动荡的根源。

Unlike Mr Erdogan’s standards of democratic legitimacy, which are structural, process legitimacy is behavioural. It concerns the way the rule of law is applied, transparency in decision making is implemented, media freedoms are protected and wider participation in policy making is ensured. Process legitimacy is also intrinsically linked to the ability of the political system to permit and respond to dissent. For liberal democracies, process legitimacy is as important as the other pillars of democratic legitimacy. That is fundamentally what distinguishes liberal democracies from illiberal ones.

埃尔多安评判民主合法性的标准是物质上的，而程序合法性是基于行为过程本身。程序合法性关注的是法治如何实施，决策过程的透明如何确保，媒体自由如何保护，以及政策制定过程中民众参与度如何保证。程序合法性也与政治体系容忍和应对异见的能力存在内在联系。对自由民主政体而言，程序合法性与民主合法性的其他支柱同等重要。它是自由民主政体与非自由民主政体的本质区别所在。

Mr Erdogan’s refusal to adopt a more conciliatory stance during the Gezi protests last year and, more recently on the allegations of corruption, is linked to his genuinely held belief that a ballot box victory combined with a sound economic performance is not only necessary but also sufficient to preserve his rule. But he is wrong.

在去年的加济公园抗议和最近抗议官员腐败事件上，埃尔多安之所以拒绝采取更倾向和解的姿态，与他真心相信的一个信念有关——选举的胜利加上漂亮的经济表现，对于维持他的执政地位而言不仅是必要条件，而且是充分条件。但他错了。

Turkey’s democracy has matured beyond the point of accepting this shallow version of a democratic contract. Mr Erdogan may still be the most popular politician in the land but his government is losing legitimacy each day that it refuses to implement fully the rule of law and to bring more transparency to policy making. That is why political instability in Turkey can no longer be appeased just by winning elections. Even if Mr Erdogan’s AK party wins the next elections, and wins big, this popular discontent will not go away.

土耳其民主的成熟度已经超越这样一种浅薄民主的契约程度。埃尔多安或许仍是土耳其最受欢迎的政客，但他只要仍拒绝完全实施法治、并实现政策制定透明化，他的政府就在一天天丧失合法性。正因如此，仅凭赢得选举已无法平息土耳其的政治动荡了。即便埃尔多安领导的正义与发展党赢得下一次选举，并且高票胜出，民众普遍的不满情绪仍不会消失。

The only way forward for the Turkish government is to recognise and address this critical shortcoming in its interpretation of democratic legitimacy. The EU can play a constructive role in nudging the government towards a more ambitious and comprehensive agenda of democratic reforms by starting talks on fundamental freedoms as part of the accession negotiations.

土耳其政府前进的唯一道路，就是承认其对民主合法性的解读存在关键缺陷，并着手解决这种缺陷。欧盟(EU)可以就一些基本自由权开始与土耳其谈判，并将其作为土耳其加入欧盟谈判的一部分，从而在推动土耳其政府迈向更具抱负、更全面的民主改革方面发挥建设性作用。

The crisis in Ukraine epitomises the dangers inherent in social and political polarisation. Turkey faces a similar challenge that can be overcome only by a wider interpretation of democratic legitimacy that goes beyond the deification of the ballot box. Only once this has happened can Turkey make the transition from the purgatory of unfulfilled democracies to the promised land of genuinely liberal democracies.

乌克兰危机体现了社会和政治极化蕴含的内在风险。土耳其面临类似的挑战，只有不再信奉选票为王，对民主合法性作出更全面的解读，才能解决这一挑战。只有到那个时候，土耳其才能走出“半吊子”民主制的炼狱，成为货真价实的自由民主制的应许之地。