美国不再企图掺和世界秩序(下)
Those calls came as APEC ministers on Friday instructed officials to develop a work plan to pursue a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, which Beijing has been pushing as an alternative to the TPP.
这些呼呼正值上周五APEC部长会议上各部长命令官员制定工作计划，推动建立亚太自贸区（Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific，北京方面一直在推动让它成为TPP之外的另一个选择）。
A growing number of countries have also said in recent days that they are examining joining another Chinese-led TPP rival, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP.
近日，还有越来越多的国家表示，正在考虑加入另一个中国主导的、与TPP竞争的协定——《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》(RCEP)。
APEC officials said that Mr Trump’s election and what was being read as a signal that the US would pull back from its current leadership role in the region had created a new atmosphere ahead of this weekend’s leaders summit.
APEC成员国官员称，特朗普当选美国总统以及外界将这解读为美国将放弃目前在该地区领导角色的信号，改变了上周末APEC领导人会议前的气氛。
There is a different dynamic around the table.
会议桌上是不一样的状态。
People are hedging their bets, said one senior official from an APEC country.
人们在为自己下的赌注对冲风险，APEC某成员国的一位高级官员表示。
Mike Froman, the US trade representative, said at a meeting of TPP ministers on Friday that other countries had discussed moving ahead without the US —
美国贸易代表迈克.弗罗曼(Mike Froman)上周五在与TPP国家的部长们举行的会议上表示，其他国家讨论了在没有美国的情况下继续推进TPP的可能。
Republican leaders in Congress have said since Mr Trump’s victory that they would not allow its ratification to go forward.
自从特朗普获胜以来，美国国会的共和党领袖一直称，他们不会允许再推进批准TPP的进程。
Mr Trump put his opposition to the TPP at the heart of his campaign, which used an antitrade message to cater to disgruntled blue-collar voters in rust belt swing states such as Ohio and Michigan.
特朗普把反对TPP放在了其竞选的核心位置，在俄亥俄和密歇根等铁锈地带的摇摆州，他的竞选造势利用了反对贸易的信息来迎合不满的蓝领选民。
But other APEC countries were also making clear to the US that they were looking to China for leadership now, he said.
但是，弗罗曼称，APEC其他成员国也向美国明确表示，他们现在正期望中国担任领导角色。
This is playing out in real time, Mr Froman told reporters.
这眼下就在上演，弗罗曼向记者表示，
We see people around the table here that are now saying that if the TPP doesn’t move forward they are going to have to put their eggs in an RCEP basket.
我们看到来这里参加会议的人说，如果TPP无法推进，他们将不得不把自己的鸡蛋放进RCEP的篮子里。
Eduardo Ferreyros, Peru’s trade minister, said APEC ministers meeting on Friday had agreed that we are not going back to protectionism.
秘鲁外贸部长爱德华多.费雷罗斯(Eduardo Ferreyros)表示，上周五的APEC部长会议已经达成一致，我们不会退回贸易保护主义。
We understand that the challenges ahead are great, but we strongly believe that if we continue working on trade liberalisation and facilitation, we will contribute to greater efficiency and competitiveness, he said.
我们清楚未来的挑战巨大，但我们坚信，如果我们继续致力于贸易自由化和便利化，我们将大大提高效率和竞争力，他说。
But other leaders warned that governments needed to do a better job of helping to address the gripes of those who felt left behind by globalisation.
但其他领导人警告称，各国政府需要更妥善地帮助化解那些感觉被全球化抛在后面的群体的不满。
It is not just a matter of education.
这不仅仅是教育问题。
It is also a matter of making sure the [economic] reality matches the rhetoric [about free trade and globalisation], said Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore’s prime minister.
也是一个确保（经济）现实与（关于自由贸易和全球化的）宣传之词相匹配的问题，新加坡总理李显龙(Lee Hsien Loong)说，
People have to feel that they have a brighter future and that this is the way forward.
人们必须感觉到自己拥有一个光明的未来，感觉到这是前进的途径。
All this was profoundly in US interests, but only when viewed from a most enlightened perspective.
这一切都极大地符合美国的利益，但必须有大智慧才能看出这一点。
Americans came to that enlightenment only after a world war, followed by the rise of Soviet communism, which persuaded them to define their interests broadly and accept responsibility for a liberal world order that benefited others as much as, sometimes more than, it benefited them.
美国人在经历一场世界大战、接着又经历了苏联共产主义的崛起后才拥有了这样的大智慧，那段历史说服美国人开始用开阔的眼光定义本国利益，承担起维护自由世界秩序的责任，这一秩序造福美国，也造福其他国家，后者的获益有时还会超过美国自身获益。
Enlightenment doesn’t last for ever, however, and with Mr Trump’s election Americans have chosen, as in 1920, a return to normalcy.
但大智慧不会一直保持，随着特朗普当选，像1920年一样，美国人选择了回归正常。
So what does the normal solipsistic superpower do? It looks for immediate threats to the homeland and finds only one: radical Islamist terrorism.
那么，正常的唯我论超级大国会做什么？它会寻找对美国国土的直接威胁，然后发现威胁只有一个：激进的伊斯兰恐怖主义。
Its foreign policy becomes primarily a counterterrorism strategy.
其外交政策基本变成反恐战略。
Nations are judged not by whether they are allies or nominal adversaries, democracies or autocracies, only by their willingness to fight Islamists.
对一个国家的判断不再依据是盟友还是名义上的对手，是民主国家还是专制国家，而只依据它们打击伊斯兰恐怖主义的意愿。
Mr Putin’s Russia, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s Egypt, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, Israel: all are equal partners in the fight and all are rewarded with control, spheres of influence and defence against critics within and without.
普京的俄罗斯、阿卜杜勒.法塔赫.塞西(Abdel Fattah al-Sisi)的埃及、巴沙尔.阿萨德(Bashar al-Assad)的叙利亚，还有以色列——在反恐斗争中都是平等的伙伴，它们得到的回报是对本国的控制、势力范围以及面对国内外批评者的自我防卫权。
Most countries, by this calculus, are irrelevant.
按照这种标准来看，大多数国家都无关紧要。
The rest is a matter of money.
剩下的就是钱的问题。
Foreign policy should serve US economic interests, and where it doesn’t should be changed.
外交政策应为美国的经济利益服务，不为这个目的服务的政策就应修改。
Trade deals should be about making money, not strengthening the global order or providing reassurance to allies living in the shadows of great powers.
签订贸易协议的目的应该是赚钱，而非强化全球秩序或是向生活在大国阴影下的盟友提供保证。
The US is no longer in the reassurance business.
美国将不再负责为别国提供保障。
For decades an abnormal US foreign policy has aimed at denying Russia and China spheres of interest.
几十年来，美国的非正常外交政策，一直以阻止俄罗斯和中国获得利益范围为目标。
That made sense when upholding an order to avoid a breakdown like that of the first half of the 20th century.
这种做法是合理的——它支撑起一种秩序，避免再次出现20世纪上半叶那种崩溃。
But a narrower reading of US interests does not require it.
但这种做法对狭隘意义上的美国利益而言是多余的。
What interest is it of the US who exercises hegemony in east Asia and in eastern and central Europe? Existing alliances need not be re¬nounced — that would be messy — but, if allies have to adjust to new realities, that is to be welcomed rather than resisted.
谁是东亚和中东欧地区的霸主，与美国的利益何干？无需声明抛弃现有的联盟（那将造成混乱），但如果美国的盟友不得不适应新的现实，美国应欢迎、而非反对。
As for the projection of US military power abroad, there should be no need.
至于在海外使用美国的军事力量，应该没有必要。
No foreign army threatens the homeland.
没有任何外国军队可以威胁美国国土。
Nuclear powers can be deterred by America’s nuclear arsenal.
美国的核武库能够威慑住几个核大国。
(Note to US hawks: there will be no bombing of Iran under a Trump administration.)
（美国鹰派请注意：特朗普政府不会对伊朗进行轰炸。）
Almost every intervention of the past 70 years was primarily to defend someone else or to uphold some principle of global order.
过去70年间，美国的几乎每一次干预主要都是为了防卫别的国家，或是维护全球秩序的一些原则。
They were wars of choice, not required by a narrow definition of US interests.
这些都是非必选的战争，而非维护狭义意义上的美国利益所必需的。
The war against radical Islamist terror can be fought by drone strikes a few special forces and by our partners on the ground.
打击伊斯兰极端恐怖势力的战争，可以利用无人机、少量特种部队以及我们在地面的合作伙伴。
None of this should sound far-fetched.
这一切听上去应该都不牵强。
This narrow, interest-based approach to foreign policy was dominant in the 1920s and 1930s.
这种狭隘、基于利益的外交政策路径在上世纪二、三十年代曾占主导地位。
It is the preferred strategy of many American academics today.
它仍是如今许多美国学者偏爱的策略。
More importantly, it plays well with an American public that has come to believe the US has been taken to the cleaners.
更重要的是，它迎合了美国公众的心理——他们渐渐相信美国被外国人占尽了便宜。
Mr Trump promises they will not be taken for suckers any more.
特朗普承诺，不会再让他们被人当成傻子。
How long can this new era last? Who knows?
这样一个新时代能持续多久？天晓得。
Americans after 1920 managed to avoid global responsibility for two decades.
1920年后，美国人曾成功地逃避了全球责任20年。
As the world collapsed around them, they told themselves it was not their problem.
当周围的世界崩塌时，他们告诉自己，这不关他们的事。
Americans will probably do the same today.
如今，美国人很可能重走旧路。
And for a while they will be right.
短期来看，他们没有错。
Because of their wealth, power and geography they will be the last to suffer the consequences of their own failures.
得益于自身的财富、力量和地理位置，美国人将最后一个尝到自己种下的苦果。
Eventually they will discover, again, that there is no escape.
但最终，他们会再次发现自己无路可逃。
The question is how much damage is done in the meantime and whether, unlike in the past, it will be too late to recover.
问题在于这期间会造成多大破坏，以及（与以往不同）是否还来得及挽回。
