查韦斯身后的委内瑞拉:现在是算总账的时候

IN THE flesh he seemed indestructible. Hugo Chávez was not especially tall, but he was built like one of the tanks he once commanded. He was possessed of seemingly inexhaustible energy. He travelled incessantly, both around his vast country and abroad. Each Sunday he would host a live television show lasting up to 12 hours. He would ring up ministers in the early hours of the morning to harangue them. For 14 years, everything that happened in Venezuela passed through his hands, or so he liked to think.

乌戈·查韦斯似乎有着一个坚不可摧的肉体。他个子不高，但体格就像他曾经指挥过的坦克一样；他似乎有着使不完的精力；他不定地在国内外四处访问；每逢周日，他都要主持一档长达12个小时的电视真人秀节目；他会在凌晨时分叫醒手下的部长，然后对他们发表长编大论。不管他是否愿意承认，他经手处理了14年中发生在委内瑞拉的每一件事。

Yet Mr Chávez turned out to have been as reckless with his health as with his country's economy and its democracy. Those late nights were fuelled by dozens of cups of sweet Venezuelan coffee. When in mid-2011 he revealed that he had been operated on for cancer, the lack of detail (“a baseball-sized tumour in the pelvic region”) suggested that the diagnosis had come late. He turned down an offer of care from a Brazilian hospital that had recently cured three Latin American presidents of cancer, preferring treatment in Cuba, where his precise condition could be kept secret. After a further two operations and chemotherapy, he declared himself cured.

然而，如同他对国家的经济和民主不在意一样，查韦斯对他的身体也毫不在意。他靠着几十杯委内瑞拉甜咖啡撑过了那些个漫长的夜晚。2011年年中，他对外界宣布自己刚刚进行了一次癌症手术，但是并没有透露细节（只说是“骨盆处有一个像棒球那样大小的肿瘤”），这让人怀疑诊断已经太晚。在拒绝了一家近来曾治愈三位拉美国家总统癌症的巴西医院提供的治疗请求后，他选择在古巴接受治疗，因为在那里接受治疗可以让外界不了解他的真实病情。在接受了两次手术和一次化疗后，查韦斯宣布自己已经痊愈。

Addicted to the drugs of power and popular acclaim, he campaigned for and won yet another six-year term in an election last October. During the campaign it was clear to those not blinded by loyalty that Mr Chávez was still a sick man. After the election he dropped out of sight, before making the sombre announcement on December 8th that he was going back to Cuba for yet another operation. If the worst happened, he said, Venezuelans should vote for Nicolás Maduro, his foreign minister and appointed vice-president, as his successor. The six-hour operation did not go well: after weeks in which his family kept a bedside vigil, joined by senior officials, Mr Chávez returned home last month, to die on March 5th at the age of 58.

出于对权力和民众崇拜的沉迷，他投身竞选并在去年10月的选举中获胜，赢得了又一个6年的执政期。在竞选期间，在那些没有被忠诚迷住眼睛的人看来，查韦斯仍是一个病人。选举结束之后，他淡出人们的视线。直到去年12月8日，他才心情沉重地宣布，他准备去古巴接受新的手术。他说，为预防最坏的情况发生，委内瑞拉人应当选举外交部长兼副总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗为他的接班人。然而6个小时的手术并不顺利：在手术后的几周内，他的家人和政府高官日夜守护在他的病床傍边。不过，他还是于上个月回到了祖国。3月5日，查韦斯去世，终年58岁。

To the end, Mr Chávez's rule was narcissistic, with country and constitution subordinated to his whim. In the tradition of the Latin American caudillo, he wanted to die with his boots on. When he was too ill to be sworn in for his new term on January 10th, his officials resolved to disregard the constitution that he himself had pushed through in 1999 and declared that the inauguration could happen at a later date.

查韦斯的统治直到最后都是一种自我陶醉型的，他要求他的国家和宪法屈从于他的各种古怪念头，他按照拉丁美洲国家元首的传统，希望死在自己的国家。在他因病重而无法于1月10日宣誓就职开始新任期的时候，政府官员决定置他于1999年亲手通过的宪法与不顾，宣布就职仪式可在今后任何一个日期举行。

Hours before announcing his leader's death, Mr Maduro made an aggressive speech, flanked by army commanders, in which he accused the opposition of conspiring to reverse the “revolution” and “historical enemies” (ie, the United States) of poisoning Mr Chávez. He expelled two American military attachés. That looked like an effort to rally the faithful for the election that will now be called.

在宣布查韦斯去世的消息之前，马杜罗在一群军官的簇拥下发表了一次具有挑衅性的演讲。在演讲中，马杜罗指责国内反对派阴谋推翻“革命”，同时还指责“宿敌（即美国）”毒死了查韦斯。随后，他宣布将两名美国武官驱逐出境。这种努力看上去是为了在马上就要举行的选举中激发选民对他的信心。

Mr Chávez is mourned by millions of Venezuelans, for whom he was a kind of Robin Hood, shouting defiance at “the empire” (the United States once again) and the “oligarchy” (ie, the rich) while handing out windfall oil revenues. His opponents, many of whom saw him as a corrupt dictator, will sense deliverance. That may be premature.

查韦斯受到了数百万委内瑞拉人的哀悼。在他们看来，查韦斯是一个罗宾汉式的人物，他一边对那个“帝国”（还是指美国）和“寡头”（即富人）发出大声的抗议，一边将大笔的石油收入分发给穷人。在他的对手看来，他是一个腐败堕落的独裁者，他们觉得将会得到解脱，但是还为时过早。

A swift election may favour Mr Maduro, a former bus drivers’ leader who has been the de facto president since December. He will benefit from a sympathy vote. The sooner he has his own mandate, the less the risk that he will face rebellion, or at least passive resistance, from within the chavista camp. The opposition candidate will probably be Henrique Capriles. A moderate centrist and dogged campaigner, in last October's vote he cut Mr Chávez's margin of victory, from 26 percentage points in 2006 to 11 points. But demoralised by defeat, the opposition fared poorly in regional elections in December, though Mr Capriles was re-elected as governor of the state of Miranda, covering much of the capital, Caracas.

马杜罗有可能在即将举行的大选中获胜。这位曾经当过公交车司机的领导人自去年12月以来一直就是实际意义上的总统。他将受益于人们的同情票。只要他早一天获得授权，就能早一天减少面对起义的风险，至少也能早一天减少面对来自查韦斯阵营的消极抵抗的风险。反对派的候选人可能是恩里克·卡普里莱斯，他是一个温和的中间派和不肯轻易认输的竞选对手。在于年10月的大选中，他把查韦斯的领先优势从2006年时的26的百分点缩小到现在的11个百分点。但是，由于在大选中的失败让反对派灰心丧气，他们在去年12月举行的地区选举中也大败而归。不过，卡普里莱斯却再次当选管辖首都加拉加斯大部分地区的米兰达州州长。

The bigger question in the months ahead will be how much will survive of Mr Chávez's “Bolivarian revolution”, named for Simón Bolívar, South America's Venezuelan-born independence hero. His reluctance to surrender power despite his illness underlined just how personal his regime was. Through a mixture of unusual political talent and extraordinary good fortune, Mr Chávez managed to make himself into a world figure, perhaps the best-known Latin American after his friend and idol, Fidel Castro. His death means he will not be around to face the reckoning after 14 years of a corrupt, oil-fuelled autocracy.

在今后几个月中，摆在委内瑞拉面前的一个更重要的问题是：查韦斯以委内瑞拉出生的南美独立英雄西蒙·玻利瓦尔的名字命名的“玻利瓦尔革命”还能坚持多久？他在病重的情况下仍然不愿交出权力突显出他的政权具有强大的个人性。通过将非凡的政治才能和出奇的好运结合在一起，查韦斯把自己塑造成了一个世界性的人物，他有可能是仅次于他的朋友和偶像的菲德尔·卡斯特罗之后最著名的拉丁美洲之人。因此，他在去世之后大概不会因14年的腐败独裁统治而面临清算。

Swapping baseball for revolution

为了革命而放弃棒球

Had things turned out differently, Hugo Chávez might have been a professional baseball player. That was his childhood dream. A typical Venezuelan mestizo, of African, indigenous and European descent, he was born in poverty (though not in the “mud hut” of the title of a hagiography) in Barinas, a remote state in the llanos, the tropical lowlands of the Orinoco basin. His father was a teacher, and his mother a teaching assistant. One of six brothers, he was largely brought up by his grandmother. He topped up the family income by selling home-made sweets in the street.

如果不是命运的阴差阳错，查韦斯本可以成为一名职业棒球选手。那是他童年时期的梦想。他是一名典型的委内瑞拉混血儿，身体里流淌着非洲人，当地土著人和欧洲后裔的血。他出身贫寒（不过并不像圣徒传记中所写的那样，出生在一个“土屋”中），家乡巴里纳斯州是一个偏远的地区，这里的大草原属于典型的奥里诺科河盆地的低地。他的父亲是一名教师，母亲在学校里做些辅助性的工作。在兄弟6人当中，他主要是由祖母带大。他在街上叫卖自家制作的甜点，给家庭增加收入。

By Mr Chávez's own account, he entered Venezuela's military academy because it had a good baseball team. As a young officer, he had a role in mopping up Cuban-supported guerrilla groups in the 1970s—a task that left him sympathetic to their aims. At the age of 23, he was already conspiring against the government.

按照查韦斯自己的讲述，他考入委内瑞拉军事学院是因为那里有一只出色的棒球队。作为一名年轻的军官，他曾在上世纪70年代参与了清剿由古巴支持的游击队的任务——不过，这次的任务让他对游击队的目标产生了同情。在23岁的时候，查韦斯已经开始策划推翻委内瑞拉政府。

In the 1980s Venezuela, previously seen as a model democracy, struggled as the price of oil, its main export, plunged and foreign debt mounted. Discontent at rising poverty, austerity and corruption exploded in three days of rioting in Caracas in 1989, and repression by the army left 400 dead. “It was the moment we were waiting for to act,” Mr Chávez said later. In February 1992, a lieutenant-colonel in command of a paratroop battalion, he made his move: he led a bloody but unsuccessful coup against the elected government of Carlos Andrés Pérez. Cashiered and jailed, he was released after just two years. He claimed that Bolívar was his inspiration.

在上世纪80年代，因其主要出口商品的石油的价格出现暴跌，同时外债累计达到了一定的程度，一度被视为民主典范的委内瑞拉局势动荡不安。人们出于对日益增长的贫困、财政紧缩和政府腐败的不满，1989年时，首都加拉加斯爆发了持续三天的暴乱。在留下400具尸体后，这场暴乱被军队镇压下去。查韦斯后来曾说：“这是我们准备行动的时刻。”1992年2月，身为空降营指挥官的陆军中校查韦斯开始了他的行动：为了推翻卡洛斯·安德烈斯·佩雷斯的当选政府，他领导了一场流血的军事政变，但没有获得成功。政变失败后，查韦斯被解除职务并被关进监狱。但是，仅仅过了两年，他就获释出狱。出狱后，查韦斯宣称他从玻利瓦尔那里获得了灵感。

Bolívar had long been the object of an official, quasi-religious cult in Venezuela—but a conservative one. Mr Chávez would appropriate the cult for his own ends: he was said to leave an empty chair at meetings, claiming it was occupied by the ghost of the great Liberator. His second source of inspiration was Fidel Castro. In 1994 he visited Cuba where he began a close friendship with Mr Castro, whom he saw “as a father” and who became his most important counsellor. The Cuban leader, who had long viewed Venezuela’s oil wealth as the key to sustaining his own regime in his energy-short island, would find in Mr Chávez what he had been seeking for decades: a powerful, unconditional ally in a large Latin American country.

在委内瑞拉，玻利瓦尔长期以来就是一位获得官方认可的、得到近似于宗教狂热般崇拜的人物——但是，他是一位保守派人士。查韦斯把这种狂热为其所用：据说，他在开会时要让一把椅子空着，他还宣称说，这样做是因为椅子早已被那位伟大的解放者的鬼魂占据了。他灵感的第二个来源是菲德尔·卡斯特罗。他在1994年出访古巴，开启了与卡斯特罗之间亲密的朋友关系，使得“父亲般”的卡斯特罗成为他最重要的一位顾问。这位古巴领导人长期以来把委内瑞拉的石油财富看作是维持其政权在那个缺少能源的岛屿上生存下去的关键，他在查韦斯身上发现了他为之寻找了几十年的东西：同一个拉美大国结成一种强有力的并且是无条件的盟友关系。

Mr Chávez's world view had a third strand, too. He was an army man through and through: his early heroes had been nationalist military dictators of the 1970s, such as Peru’s Juan Velasco Alvarado and Panama’s Omar Torrijos. As Enrique Krauze, a Mexican writer, has pointed out, from eclectic reading Mr Chávez acquired the conviction that history is made by great men. He was influenced, too, by Norberto Ceresole, an obscure Argentine fascist who advised him when he was first in government. His regime had an anti-semitic undertone. The notion, peddled by some of his foreign supporters, that Mr Chávez was a moderate radicalised only by implacable opposition both at home and in Washington, does not square with the evidence.

查韦斯对世界的看法还有第三个来源。作为一名纯粹的军人，查韦斯的早期崇拜者是上世纪70年代那些具有民族主义思想的军事独裁者，如秘鲁的胡安·贝拉斯科·阿尔瓦拉多和巴拿马的奥马尔·托里霍斯。正如墨西哥作家恩里克·克劳泽所指出的那样，查韦斯通过大量的阅读认识到，历史是由大人物创造的。对查韦斯产生影响的另一位人物是诺伯托·赛里索尔，这位少为人知的阿根廷法西斯主义者，在查韦斯第一次被关进监狱时曾给他提出过一些建议。他的政权还带有一种反犹太主义的潜在倾向。据查韦斯的部分国外支持者说，那种认为查韦斯是一位温和的激进主义主义者的观念同事实不符。

Mr Chávez was reluctantly persuaded—probably by Mr Castro—that elections were better than force as a route to power. His promises of a clean sweep of the old order and an end to poverty and corruption won him the presidency in December 1998 with 56% of the vote. His first act was to call a Constituent Assembly, which wrote a new constitution, approved by referendum. It enshrined respect for private property, human rights and an independent judiciary. But it also expanded the powers of the presidency and the armed forces. It gave Mr Chávez a chance to appoint loyalists to the supreme court and other nominally independent institutions.

可能是在卡斯特罗的说服下，查韦斯勉强地接受了这样一种思想，那就是：同武力夺取政权相比，选举是一条更好的道路。在1998年的大选中，他向选民承诺废除旧秩序、终结贫困和腐败，最终以56%的支持率当选总统。当选后，他的第一个行动是召集立宪大会制定新宪法，并在随后举行的全民公决中获得通过。虽然新宪法对私有财产、人权和独立司法表示出极大的尊重，但是这部宪法也扩大了总统和军队的权力，使查韦斯有机会任命忠实于他的人进入最高法院和其他一些有名无实的独立机构。

Unlike Mr Castro, Mr Chávez derived his legitimacy from the ballot box. He would win three further presidential elections. But he ruled by confrontation and decree, rather than consensus. That triggered severe political unrest. The tensions came to a head on April 11th 2002, when hundreds of thousands marched on the presidential palace to demand Mr Chávez’s resignation: 19 people died, many killed by snipers who were never identified. When the army refused his order to use force to suppress the protests, the president surrendered his office; his most senior general told the nation he had resigned. But after a conservative business leader proclaimed himself president on April 12th and declared the constitution abolished, the army switched sides again and restored Mr Chávez to power.

与卡斯特罗不同的是，查韦斯的政权因出自选举而具有合法性。虽然他在此后的总统选举中又三次获胜，但是他的统治依靠的是对抗和强制命令，而不是共识。这引发了严重的政治动荡。2002年4月11日，紧张气氛达到高潮。当时，成百上千的游行人群来到总统府要求查韦斯辞职。但是，有19人在游行中死亡，其中大部分人是被永远也无法的到确认的狙击手杀害的。当军方拒绝了查韦斯提出的使用武力镇压游行示威活动的命令时，这位委内瑞拉的总统只得在他的办公室中举手投降；随后，他手下的高级军官宣布，总统已经辞职。但是，当一位保守派的商界领袖在4月12日宣布自己接任总统并声明废除宪法后，军方又迅速地转变了立场，把权力重新还给查韦斯。

The elected autocracy

选出来的独裁政权

That was a turning point. An opposition strike later that year paralysed PDVSA, the state oil monopoly, but it failed. Through the medium of these conflicts, Mr Chávez neutralised all potential rival sources of power. He turned PDVSA and the Central Bank into vehicles for opaque, off-budget spending. He staffed the government, the bureaucracy and the armed forces according to loyalty rather than merit. He packed the courts, and gained full control of the legislature, thanks to an ill-advised opposition boycott in 2005. When a revived opposition later did well in regional and legislative elections, he stripped local government and the National Assembly of much of their powers.

这是查韦斯政治生涯的一个转折点。当年晚些时候，反对派发起了一场运动，原本想令国有的石油垄断企业委内瑞拉国家石油公司（PDVSA）陷入瘫痪，但是最终还是失败了。通过这一系列的冲突，查韦斯成功地瓦解了所有潜在对手的权力根基。他把PDVSA和委内瑞拉央行变成不透明的预算外开支机器。他任命政府和军方官员的标准不是根据他们的功绩，而是根据他们对他的忠诚度。得益于反对派在2005年发起的一场不明智的抵制运动，查韦斯得以将他的人安插到法院，并且获得了对立法系统的绝对控制。当反对派在晚些时候举行的地方选举和立法会选举中卷土重来之时，查韦斯又剥夺了地方政府和国民议会的大部分权力。

Three other things had come to Mr Chávez's rescue. The first was the spectacular rise in the world price of oil, which provided nearly all Venezuela's export earnings. In real terms, between 2000 and 2012 Venezuela's total oil revenues were more than two and a half times as great as those of the preceding 13 years—even though output declined after 2000 (see chart 1). The second was the advice of Mr Castro. Cuban officials drew up new social programmes, known as “missions”, starting with primary health care and adult education. In return for virtually free oil, Cuba provided Venezuela with thousands of doctors and sports trainers. Cuban intelligence and security agents surrounded Mr Chávez: he would never again be caught off-guard by street protests.

除此之外，还有三个事件拯救了查韦斯。第一件事情是世界油价的惊人上涨。由于石油收入占了委内瑞拉几乎全部的出口所得，即便其产量在2000年以后开始下降，但是在2000年到2012年间，石油收入仍是此前13年的2.5倍（如图表1）。第二件事情是来自卡斯特罗的建议。当时，古巴的官员为委内瑞拉制定了一些名为“布道”的新型的社会项目，首当其冲的是基本医疗保健和成人教育。由于委内瑞拉提供给古巴的石油近乎免费，作为报答，古巴向委内瑞拉派出了数千名医生和体育教练，古巴情报和安全部门的特工也为查韦斯提供了全方位的保护，使他从此再也没有陷入街头抗议活动的骚扰。

The missions and the flood of oil money helped the president defeat a referendum in 2004 that would have removed him from office. He cowed the opposition. He harassed its media outlets: today, most free-to-air television channels spout government propaganda. The names of the 3.6m who signed the petition calling for the recall referendum were published; some were sacked from state jobs or denied passports or other official services.

这些布道活动和大量的石油收入帮助查韦斯挺过了2004年那场本应该令其下台的全民公决。获胜后的查韦斯对反对派又是威胁又是恐吓，并且还对国家宣传机器进行严格的管制：如今，大部分免费播出的电视频道都在为政府摇旗呐喊。同时，查韦斯还将在那些在全民公决的请愿书上签名的360万人的名字公诸于众；这之后，有人因此而失掉了政府的工作，有人因此而无法拿到护照，还有人因此而不得参与国家事务。

The third godsend for Mr Chávez was George W. Bush. Thanks to the worldwide unpopularity of the American president, he could use his address to the UN to mock Mr Bush as “the devil”. He deployed his talents as a propagandist to weave a fiction to the effect that the coup attempt against him in April 2002 had been backed by the United States.

小布什是查韦斯的第三个天赐之物。多亏这位美国总统在世界范围内不受欢迎，查韦斯利用他在联合国的演讲嘲笑布什，把他说成是“魔鬼”。他施展其鼓动家的才能虚构出一个故事，从而到达了将发生在2002年4月的军事政说成是变得到了美国支持的效果。

In 2006 Mr Chávez won a landslide victory. At the height of his power, he declared that he was implanting “21st-century socialism”, though he never defined exactly what this was. He nationalised swathes of the economy, including telecommunications, electricity, cement and parts of the oil industry still in private hands.

在2006年的大选中，查韦斯以压倒性的优势赢得了胜利。在他的权力巅峰时期，查韦斯称他正在为委内瑞拉灌输“21世纪的社会主义”。不过，他从未对这个概念给出过一个明确的定义。他还将大量的企业收归国有，这其中即包括电信、电力、水泥，也包括部分仍由私人控制的石油企业。

Mr Chávez’s domination of Venezuela was never absolute. The two-party democracy of 1958-98 bequeathed a popular belief in democratic values. In 2007 he lost a referendum on constitutional changes aimed at making his revolution irreversible (though many of these measures were later brought into law by decree).

不过，查韦斯对委内瑞拉的控制从未达到绝对的程度。1958年-1998年期间形成的两党民主制度给这个国家遗留下一个广受信赖的民主价值观。为了让给他的革命成为不可逆转的进程，查韦斯相对宪法进行修改。为此，委内瑞拉在2007年举行全民公决，查韦斯在这次全民公决中大败而归。（但是没过多久，他的许多措施就在行政命令的要求下被强行写入宪法）。

Everything Mr Chávez did was calculated to shore up his support among a majority of Venezuelans, while ignoring or harassing the rest. His original base was those people who laboured in the informal economy, which had blossomed in the 1980s after the end of the previous oil boom. To this he added a growing army of public-sector workers: under him, the public payroll more than doubled, to 2.4m.

查韦斯的所作所为一方面是为了提高他在大多数委内瑞拉人之中的支持率，一方面是为了打击和骚扰另一部分人。他的统治基础是那些在非正规经济中谋生的人，他们大多出生在前一次石油繁荣之后的上世纪80年代。为了达到他的这个目标，查韦斯让他们成为在政府公共部门工作的工人：在他的支持下，在公共部门的工资翻了一番，人数也达到240万人。

Sent by God

上帝派来的

Most of the motley collection of parties that backed the Bolivarian revolution were merged into the Venezuelan United Socialist Party (PSUV). Mr Chávez also created two other instruments of control: a militia of around 125,000, answerable directly to him rather than the army command; and a network of community councils which took over many of the functions (and revenues) of local government. Foreign leftist academics claimed that all this added up to an empowering “direct democracy”, superior to the incipient welfare state set up by Latin America’s social-democratic governments. But to others, it looked like a top-down charade of participation, in which all power lay with the president.

支持“玻利瓦尔革命”的政党五花八门，在查韦斯的整合下，其中的大部分政党合并组成了“委内瑞拉社会主义统一党”（PSUV）。除此之外，查韦斯还组建了两个特殊的统治工具：一个是由大约125000人组成的民兵组织，它不归军方指挥，直接听命于查韦斯本人；另一个是被称为社区委员会的体系，这些委员会接管了地方政府的大部分功能（以及税收收入）。在国外的极端左翼分子看来，把所有这些措施加起来形成了一种“直接民主”的授权。同拉美的社会党政府建立的福利制度相比，这种“直接民主”授权具有优越性。。但是，在其他人看来，这种民主看起来就像是一种自上而下的虚伪的参与体系，在这种体系中，所有的权力都掌握在总统手里。

Behind the propaganda, the Bolivarian revolution was a corrupt, mismanaged affair. The economy became ever more dependent on oil and imports. State takeovers of farms cut agricultural output. Controls of prices and foreign exchange could not prevent persistent inflation and engendered shortages of staple goods. Infrastructure crumbled: most of the country has suffered frequent power cuts for years. Hospitals rotted: even many of the “missions” languished. Crime soared: Caracas is one of the world’s most violent capitals. Venezuela has become a conduit for the drug trade, with the involvement of segments of the security forces.

抛开这些宣传，“玻利瓦尔革命”就是一个腐败堕落而且管理混乱的事件。在这场革命的影响下，国家经济对石油和出口的依赖越来越严重；将农场收归国有造成农产品产量下降；对价格和外汇实行管制无法阻止通货膨胀一再发生，并且还造成了日常用品的短缺。国家基础设施供不应求：数年来，这个国家的大部分地区一直都在遭受经常断电的困扰。医院陈旧老化：就连许多“布道”工程都已经停止运转。犯罪直线上升：首都加拉加斯已成为世界上暴力犯罪最严重的首都之一，委内瑞拉已经成为毒品交易的一条通道，甚至国家安全部队的一些人员也参与其中。

Mr Chávez’s supreme political achievement was that many ordinary Venezuelans credited him with the handouts and did not blame him for the bungling. They saw him as one of them, as being on their side. His supporters, especially women, would say: “This man was sent by God to help the poor.” He had llanero wit and charm, and an instinctive sense of political opportunity. He deployed these talents each Sunday on “Aló, Presidente”, his interminable talk show. He had the skills of a televangelist, as Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera, two Venezuelan writers, put it in a revealing biography.

查韦斯最大的政治成就在于赢得了大部分普通委内瑞拉人的信任，并且他们不不会因为管理不善而对他表示不满。他们把查韦斯看作是他们中的一员，因此他们认为查韦斯会站在他们的一边。他的支持者，尤其是妇女支持者会说：“这个人是上帝派来帮助穷人的。”他有着大草原人特有的智慧和魅力，他对政治时机有着本能的感觉，他把这些才华都用在了每个星期日的“你好，总统”这档谈话秀节目中，节目中的查韦斯口若悬河，滔滔不绝。正如委内瑞拉的两位作家——Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera在那本揭秘性的传记中所说的那样，查韦斯具有一种电视布道者的才能。

Abroad, Mr Chávez deployed Venezuela's oil wealth to build an anti-American block he called the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (Alba). As well as Cuba, this included Bolivia and Ecuador, where far-left leaders were elected in the mid-2000s and several small client states in Central America and the Caribbean. For years he maintained a barely veiled alliance with Colombia’s FARC guerrillas, allowing them to use Venezuela as a base.

在国外，查韦斯利用委内瑞拉的石油财富打造了一块反美的地区，他把这块地区称之为“美洲玻利瓦尔联盟”（Alba）。该联盟的成员除古巴之外，还包括在21世纪头十年中期开始由左翼执政的玻利维亚和厄瓜多尔，以及中美洲和加勒比海的数个附属小国。数年来，查韦斯一直同“哥伦比亚革命武装力量”游击队保持着几乎不加掩饰的盟友关系，并且允许他们把委内瑞拉当做基地。

Argentina’s Cristina Fernández and her husband and predecessor, Néstor Kirchner, were semi-detached friends and clients. Venezuela bought Argentine bonds. In 2007 an alert customs official in Buenos Aires opened a suitcase stuffed with $800,000 in cash that was, its Venezuelan owner later confessed, a donation to Ms Fernández’s election campaign.

查韦斯同阿根廷的克里斯蒂娜·费尔南德斯和他的丈夫、已故前总统内斯托·基什内尔保持着半朋友半生意的关系。委内瑞拉购买阿根廷债券。在2007年的时候，布宜诺斯艾利斯的一位海关官员在打开一部手提箱时大吃已经，发现里面装满了800000美元的现金。据这个手提箱的委内瑞拉主人事后承认，这是送给费尔南德斯夫人进行竞选的捐款。

Alba was inimical to Brazil’s ambitions to lead South America. But Brazil’s left-wing presidents, while governing as moderate social-democrats, found it useful to indulge Mr Chávez. They appeared to see him as a means to blunt American influence in the region, while his economic mismanagement gave Brazilian business the chance to supply the goods and services that Venezuela ceased to produce.

对于巴西来说，“美洲玻利瓦尔联盟”不利于她实现领导南美洲的野心。但是，巴西的的左翼领导人却发现，纵容查韦斯有利于巴西。他们似乎是把他当做是消弱美国在该地区影响力的手段，同时查韦斯在经济上的管理不善也让巴西的企业抓住机会向委内瑞拉推销这个国家已经不再生产的商品和服务。

Further afield, Mr Chávez delighted in embracing the world’s autocrats and dictators. He forged an alliance with Iran, which offered opaque “technical co-operation”. He agreed to buy arms worth some $15 billion, mainly from Vladimir Putin’s Russia. He made friends with Saddam Hussein, Robert Mugabe, Muammar Qaddafi and Bashar Assad.

在拉美之外的地区，查韦斯乐于同世界上的独裁政权和专制政府打交道。他同伊朗结成联盟，目的是提供“不透明的技术合作”；他同意从弗拉基米尔·普京的俄罗斯购进价值150亿美元的武器；他还同萨达姆·侯赛因、罗伯特·穆加贝、迈阿穆尔·卡扎菲以及巴沙尔·阿萨德是朋友。

In Latin America Mr Chávez’s influence declined after 2006. Economic growth made the region’s voters less angry; and many Latin American left-wingers came to realise that chavismo was a blind alley. Though poverty fell fast in Venezuela, so it did elsewhere, as the commodity boom lifted the region (see chart 2). Some on the left had always been critical. Carlos Fuentes, a Mexican writer, dubbed Mr Chávez a “tropical Mussolini”. The 2008-09 world economic slowdown exposed the weaknesses of chavismo. While much of the rest of Latin America recovered quickly, Venezuela remained in recession for two years.

自2006年以来，查韦斯在拉美的影响力开始下降。虽然经济增长使这个地区的选民变得不像以前那样愤愤不平，但是拉美左翼的大部分人开始认识到，查韦斯主义是一条没有希望的道路。随着大宗商品泡沫提升了该地区的实力，尽管委内瑞拉的贫困快速减少，但是贫困依然无处不在（见图表2）。一部分左翼人士对查韦斯一直持批评的态度。例如。墨西哥作家卡洛斯·富恩特斯就把他成为“热带的墨索里尼”。2008年-2009年的世界经济放缓将查韦斯主义的短处暴露无遗。就在其他拉美国家快速复苏之际，委内瑞拉的经济却连续两年处于衰退之中。

Subordinates without a chief

群龙无首

The Bolivarian revolution now faces its greatest test. Without doubt, chavismo will outlive its founder. Many ordinary Venezuelans will look back on his rule with fondness. But his heirs will have to grapple with some intractable problems.

“玻利瓦尔革命”目前正面临着起开始以来的最大考验。查韦斯主义的寿命毫无疑问会超过其缔造者的寿命。大多数委内瑞拉的普通民众会用一种赞赏的心情来回顾这段时期，但是摆在查韦斯后人面前的是一些不得不处理棘手难题。

After a pre-election spending binge last year, the economy is slowing again. Faced with shortages of many goods, including hard currency, Mr Maduro devalued the bolívar by 32% in February. Venezuela comes towards the bottom of just about every league table for good governance or economic competitiveness. For 14 years Venezuelans have been told that their problems were caused by somebody else—the United States or “the oligarchy”. Getting ahead has depended on political loyalty rather than merit. The mass enrolment of millions in “universities” that mainly impart propaganda have raised expectations that are almost bound to be dashed.

在经历了去年选前的那段开支热潮之后，委内瑞拉的经济再次进入衰退。面对包括美元在内的多数商品出现短缺的现状，马杜罗在今年2月份宣布将委内瑞拉货币玻利瓦尔贬值32%。无论是在有效管理还是经济竞争力方面，玻利维亚几乎在每一个排行榜上都排在最后几位。在过去的14年间，委内瑞拉人一直都在被告知：他们的问题都是由其他人造成的——除了美国就是“寡头”，出人头地要靠政治上的忠诚而不是你的长处，主要由宣传机器制造出来的数百万“大学”生的希望几乎肯定会破灭。

Assuming the PSUV wins the election, it will be ill-equipped to grapple with these problems. None of its leaders has the authority of Mr Chávez, nor his skill at communicating with the masses. While affable, Mr Maduro is a yes-man lacking political weight, according to a former Latin American foreign minister who dealt with him. Diosdado Cabello, the Speaker of the National Assembly and an army colleague of Mr Chávez, has declared his support for Mr Maduro, but has ambitions of his own. Perhaps only the Cuban leadership can preserve unity among the chavistas. The stakes are high. Cuba’s president, Raúl Castro, knows that the loss of Venezuelan oil would plunge his country’s economy deeper into penury.

如果委内瑞拉社会主义统一党在大选中获胜，它几乎无力处理这些问题。该党的任何一位领导人不仅不具有查韦斯的权威性，也不具备他那种同大众交流的能力。据一位曾同马杜罗打过交道的拉美国家前外交官说，虽说这个人和蔼可亲，但是作为老好人的他在政治舞台上缺乏分量。国民大会主席迪奥斯达多??卡维略是查韦斯在军队中的同事，他虽然宣布支持马杜罗，但是他有自己的野心。除此之外，唯一有可能让查韦斯主义者保持团结的人选就是古巴领导人。不过，风险是相当大的。古巴总统劳尔·卡斯特罗深知，失去委内瑞拉的石油将使他的国家经济陷入更加困难的境地。

A majority of Venezuelans may eventually come to see that Mr Chávez squandered an extraordinary opportunity for his country, to use an unprecedented oil boom to equip it with world-class infrastructure and to provide the best education and health services money can buy. But this lesson will come the hard way, and there is no guarantee that it will be learned.

大多数委内瑞拉人最后都会认识到：查韦斯让这个国家浪费了一次千载难逢的机会：利用史无前例的石油热潮，用世界一流的基础设施来装配这个国家，并且利用金钱能买到的最好的教育和医疗保健提供给他的民众。虽然这个教训的代价很大，但是没有人能保证委内瑞拉一定能吸取这个教训。